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This book “proposes to trace the development of Peirce’s realism from its early roots in 
scholastic realism, to its eventual revision and consequent rift with Scotus’s position, 
which I call Peirce’s ‘realicism’” (1.)  Thus, from this statement on the first page and 
from the title of the book, one becomes aware of author Maria Perez-Teran Mayorga’s 
intention to outline the American pragmatist C.S. Peirce’s metaphysical realism, and 
then distinguish that realism from the realism of medieval philosopher John Duns 
Scotus—the term “realicism” designating the difference between these two 
philosophers’ positions.  A foremost task in Mayorga’s analysis is to discuss the reality 
status of universals, a central concern for the medieval schoolmen and for Peirce.  Few 
have taken undertaken such a task, and Mayorga stands next to just one other scholar 
who has written a book like hers: John Boler and his 1963 seminal work, Charles Peirce 
and Scholastic Realism.  Mayorga’s text extends and develops the conversation 
regarding Peirce and realism by discussing his metaphysics vis-à-vis the historical 
development of the idea of universals (in Chapter One), by explicating at length 
Scotus’s position about universals and how that position relates to Peirce’s brand of 
realism (Chapter Two), and by locating the realist elements in Peirce’s metaphysics in 
light of Scholastic philosophy as a whole (Chapter Three.)  The conclusion draws these 
chapters together and recasts the major arguments of the book, as well as articulates 
how exactly the author brought together and clarified the relationship between Scotus’s 
and Peirce’s brand of realism.  All in all, this book would be of interest for those who 
are interested in Peirce studies, medieval philosophy, and the realist anti-realist debate 
as it discusses Peirce’s metaphysics and medieval philosophies of realism and 
nominalism. 
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Chapter One, “The Problem of Universals: Back to the Past,” sets out to acquaint the 
reader with the problems and figures associated with the realist and nominalist debate.  
While discussing the debate Moyarga focuses upon “the problem of universals,” which 
may be stated as follows, “First, what kind of thing is this concept?  Is it in my mind, or 
is it something outside my mind that I somehow ‘tie’ into?” (7.)  At issue is the 
ontological status of universals.  Nominalists believe that only particulars are real, 
whereas realists affirm a mind independent status and reality for universals. The 
difficulty is that individual sounds and examples, that is, particulars, somehow refer to 
something general or universal.  Mayorga, herself a realist, argues that while the 
reference to a general or universal might be problematic, knowledge in general must be 
possible, “for it seems that even though the things we encounter in the world are 
particular…in order to make any knowledge claims about them, we have to think in 
general terms, that is, in terms of universals” (8.)  The ancient Greeks and medieval 
schoolmen, Mayorga explains, shared the view that not only particulars, but also 
universals, are real and they attempted to solve “the problem of universals.” Plato, 
Aristotle, Porphyry, Boethius, and Avicenna are all discussed in detail with respect to 
how each tried to solve the problem.  One philosopher in this list, Avicenna, stood out 
to me as I read this chapter.  Mayorga eloquently explains how Avicenna’s arguments 
lead his reader to consider how nature “in itself” is neither absolutely particular nor 
absolutely universal.  As Mayorga puts it, “Avicenna claims that the nature-in-itself or 
the nature considered ‘absolutely,’ as Scotus will refer to it, or per se, is neither one nor 
many, neither particular nor universal” (34.)  According to Avicenna, nature itself (not 
just our way of conceiving it) is “neutral” and “indifferent,” it has no “numerical unity” 
so it is not singular or individual nor is it a general or universal.  However, nature does 
afford itself to the division of particularity and the abstraction of generality.  Of course, 
the question follows, then, what is nature afterall if its not itself a particular or general?  
The answer is that nature is not a “thing” but rather an availability for things to be in 
their respective state of being, particular or general.  Again, Avicenna denies 
particularity and universality to nature-in-itself, but these modes do have a certain kind 
of being abstracted by human minds.  He argued that nature’s own “essence” is prior to 
being in particulars and being in the mind, as Mayorga explains.  This seems to be a 
moderate realist position. 
 
In Chapter Two, “Duns Scotus,” Mayorga clarifies how Scotus’s position, like 
Avicenna’s, maintains that universals are real, yet depend on the human intellect for 
abstraction.  Each particular or individual thing contains its respective universal (a view 
influenced by the metaphysics of Aristotle) but that universal does not fully exist until 
it is abstracted by a human mind, when the general becomes “a numerically one 
universal that applies to many” (49.)  Thus Scotus’s realism is separated from 
nominalism “by a hair” (that the human mind creates universals, rather than picks them 
out in things themselves would be nominalism.)  Interestingly, we also find that for 
Scotus, “the complete universal is singular [particular] because it exists in a single 
intellect” (49.)  So particular things contain universals without contradiction as 
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universals take on their real general status once abstracted in a human mind.  That 
generality is dependent upon the human mind and takes it shape dependent upon 
abstraction is remarkably close to how Peirce would come to see the status of 
universals in his evolutionary metaphysics. Peirce believed in the reality of generals—
but generals always embodied and informed by human observers in their respective 
contexts.  One might say that in this way these universals could be called “objectively 
relative.”  The embodiment of generals is determined by the various modes of being 
(particular, general, and the availability for particularity and generality)—and Peirce 
outlined the features of those modes in his categories of experience.  For Scotus, the 
“intrinsic modes” of particular things “are the way in which beings are differentiated” 
and hence help constitute how generality takes it shape (50.)   
 
In Chapter Three, “Charles Peirce,” Mayorga claims that “in order to understand Peirce 
properly one must try to understand his scholastic realism…[and] many commentators 
are not truly aware of the specific claims that Scotus made and with which (for the most 
part) Peirce so enthusiastically agreed” (71.)  After a brief review of the various realist 
positions ranging from Plato to Scotus, Mayorga sets out Peirce’s quotes that praise 
Scotus’s work, yet in the end she notes how Peirce chided Scotus for not taking realism 
far enough in establishing the kind of developmental reality that generals must possess.  
For Peirce, generality was, itself, a mode of being that he called “Thirdness,” in 
contradistinction to the mode of being that is possibility (called “Firstness”) and the 
mode of being that is actuality (called “Secondness.”)  Thirdness-generality represents 
the tentative synthesis of the other two categories of being and is always on its way to 
further development.  Here the reader may notice that Peirce is not only a realist when 
it comes to universals, he is articulating an evolutionary metaphysics as well that is 
similar to Hegel, Schelling, and the German idealists.  Given his categorical theory, 
Peirce’s philosophy is also similar to the category theories of Aristotle and Kant.  
“Realicism,” to this reader, is a shorthand term for Peirce’s phenomenological revision 
of, and eventual rift with, Scotesian realism, and it is also a term indicating Peirce’s 
unique philosophy of categorical theory and evolutionary metaphysics.   
 
So far as metaphysics is concerned, Mayorga elaborates how Peirce associated 
nominalism with materialism.  Ideal essences, or a substantial reality for universals 
existing completely and absolutely separate from a material realm, would have no part 
in such a theory.  On the other hand, Peirce stated that idealism’s penchant for 
universals which subsist in another realm of thought, and which are accessible only 
through intuition or special revelation (recollection, for example, in Plato’s account of 
knowledge) is untenable as well.  While Peirce, like Scotus, in his metaphysics appears 
to have placed ideality—and universals or generals—within the particular objects of a 
physical universe, he did not exclude generality’s own nature (Thirdness) and he did 
not subsume that nature to Secondness.  Each requires the other and is enhanced by the 
other, and Peirce saves himself from idealistic dogmatism and materialistic skepticism 
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alike.  Mayorga puts it this way, “Materialism without idealism is blind, idealism 
without materialism is void”  (78.)   
 
Strict nominalism obviously has undesirable consequences for Peirce: it is a position 
that denies knowledge.  However, Peirce would deny that universals and generality are 
unaffected by the categories of Secondness (actuality) and Firstness (possibility), given 
his evolutionary view of the universe.  In short this means that universals are first, 
always embodied in particulars, and on this point he is in full agreement with Scotus.  
Second, this means that universals are abstracted by the human mind from those 
particular things during the process of inquiry—another point that seems to be in 
agreement with Scotus.  And third, universals appear to change over time, and we know 
this due to the fact that the mind directly accesses these universals via the 
phenomenological method, that is, by reflecting upon the ways in which universals are 
abstracted from within first-person conscious experience.  From this experience one can 
account for changes in generality.  To say that universals appear to “change” during an 
evolutionary course might appear strange. A universal, by its very definition, requires 
closure in the sense that it is a definition under which all particular things of a 
corresponding type must apply.  Peirce thought, however, to claim that the truth of a 
universal could only hold indefinitely in a state of affairs where there can possibly be no 
further abstraction—a state of affairs where generality has developed into a final and 
completed state subsuming all relevant particulars, an ultimate form of generality, as it 
were.  He titled this final state of affairs, “the ideal state of complete information.” 
 
Mayorga stops short of discussing what this ideal state of complete information would 
look like.  For Peirce, the ideal state of complete information functions like an 
epistemological regulative ideal, in the Kantian sense.  In the metaphysical sense, it 
functions much like Schelling’s Absolute—a modified form of Hegel’s Absolute Mind 
that does unfold throughout cosmic history yet does not necessarily end in any 
necessitated completion because real chance (found in Firstness-possibility, also 
represented by spontaneity and freedom) always survives among the various categories 
of being.  Mayorga’s section “The Real, the True, and Reality” does clarify Peirce’s 
realism, idealism, and “pragmaticism” (Peirce’s term for pragmatism, changed to “keep 
it safe from kidnappers”) as well as those terms relationship to the ideal state of 
complete information and potential end of all inquiry.  Possibility’s relationship to 
generality, as Peirce understood it, shall always figure in the universe, and his 
metaphysics ultimately preserves the freedom of inquiry in an unfolding cosmos.  
Mayorga writes, “Peirce does not assert that there will be an exact point in time when 
inquiry will end.  We can never be completely certain that we have achieved ultimate 
knowledge” (99.)   
 
The conclusion of this book does a nice job of telling the differences between the 
various realisms discussed throughout the three previous chapters—and Mayorga 
admits that Peirce’s realism is an idealistic one, an idealism that sees “the real” 
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ultimately as part of human cognition, but not necessarily created by that cognition, 
from scratch.  So yes, in the end we see that Peirce is a realist of the Scholastic stripe; 
but he is a “realicist” to be more accurate—because for him, the world itself is real yet 
interlocked with the human mind.  For him, reality is of a mental nature not necessarily 
entirely dependent upon human minds, but requiring human minds for the full 
abstraction of its latent universals.  That is, what is “knowable” in nature necessarily 
has a mind “relatedness” in it, and requires a mind for the activation of its full being.  
This being changes over time and tends toward states that can be known in the future, 
but a future state where generality is concretely fulfilled remains an ideal, not a 
predetermined or necessitated end. 
